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 WORDS OF HOPE:  A POSTMODERN FAITH 
       
SAMUEL SMITH 
   Assistant Professor of English 
          Messiah College 
       
 
        What we see now is like a dim image in a  
        mirror; then we shall see face-to-face.   
        What I know now is only partial; then it  
        will be complete-as complete as God's  
        knowledge of me. 
      St. Paul, 1  
        Corinthians 13:12 
 
 
     I would like to respond to Paul Nisly's recent essay,  
 
"A Word of Hope," published in Faculty Dialogue 17 (Spring  
 
1992): 113-17.  That essay strikes me as a fairly typical  
 
evangelical response to postmodern literary discourse, and I  
 
wish to address Nisly's articulation of that response as an  
 
accurate representation of a large sector of the evangelical  
 
literary and hermeneutical community.  I will offer a  
 
critical response to some of the problems raised by Nisly's  
 
paradigmatic stance toward language and texts.1  I profess  
 
English at Messiah College, so I am a member of a community  
 
which is committed to identifying and understanding humanity  
 
in terms of the Christian story.  I believe the essence of  
 
this gospel to be God's presence in Christ reconciling the  
 
world to God. 
 
     To begin, while I disagree with Nisly's assessment of  
 
postmodern literary criticism, I too believe that "words,  
 
though limited, are God's gift to us humans" (113, my  
 
emphasis).  But I do not believe that words are limited to  
 
"a meaning which we can discover" (113).  The sense of  
 
discovering meaning occurs when we learn what our (or  
 
another) interpretive community means by certain words or  
 
groups of words; but the meaning of those words has been  
 
created, revised, and often reshaped by the human community  
 
that generated those words and through which those words  
 
have passed.  So there is a sense that as communities and  
 
individuals we also use words to create and shape meaning.   
 
In fact, that is the central thesis of postmodernism:  the  
 
creating and shaping of meaning by human communities and by  
 
individuals thinking, speaking, and acting within the  
 
context of communities. 
 
     For this reason I find Nisly's identification of what  
 
he calls "postmodern meaninglessness" an inaccurate representation of 
postmodern literary critical dialogue as a  
 whole.  He misrepresents postmodernism by identifying only  
 
its extreme formulations, and this enables him to describe  
 
postmodern thinkers as absolute relativists who play  
 
hide-and-seek games behind obscure and impenetrable language  
 
(you would think they were all apocalypticists).  But are  
 
all postmodernists absolute relativists?  Nisly would have  
 
us believe so:  "All language and all knowledge-we are told,  
 
usually much less succinctly-is a matter of perspective;  
 
your perspective, my perspective, anyone's perspective; and  
 
no perspective is to be trusted" (114).  I believe it is  
 
true that all language and all knowledge is a matter of  
 
perspective (and if you wish to hear a postmodernist say  
 
this succinctly in "plain" language you should read Stanley  
 
Fish).  But most postmodernists do not identify that  
 
perspective as subjectively as Nisly identifies it here.   
 
That perspective is individual and personal in a real sense,  
 
but it is just as significantly grounded in communal  
 
understanding and in historically authorized paradigms that  
 
have enabled clear and understandable agreement about  
 
humanity and the universe until new paradigms displace or  
 supplement them (as when a Luther or an Einstein or a Freud  
 
comes along).  Thus it is not true, as Nisly asserts, that  
 
the "postmodern view of language is rooted in a profound  
 
skepticism about the possibility of arriving at any  
 
commonality of meaning, any truth" (114).  On the contrary,  
 
postmodernist views of language are often rooted in a  
 
profound humility regarding the limitations of human  
 
understanding and the seemingly infinite possibilities of  
 
human speech.  Most postmodernists assume that humans in  
 
community are every day arriving at commonality of meaning  
 
and truth (notice how much and how often they are talking  
 
intelligibly to one another?).  For the postmodernist,  
 
meaning and perspective is shaped and understood in the  
 
context of interpretative communities, and this results in  
 
hope as often as despair, and in dialogue more than  
 
monologue (more meaning negotiated, less meaning assumed).   
 
 
 
     Nisly's own apparent assumptions about language lead  
 
him to mistakenly identify postmodern theories of language  
 
with particular postmodern worldviews:  "Much of  
 contemporary literary theory is based on a worldview which  
 
is-after one cuts through the complex verbiage-very similar  
 
to Hazel Motes'.  In brief, there is no truth, there are  
 
only (possibly) useful interpretations for our times." (114)   
 
But the "useful interpretations for our times" are the  
 
truths by which we live:  one century according to the laws  
 
of Newtonian physics, or salvation through Church  
 
sacraments, or the belief that St. Paul had forbidden women  
 
to exercise leadership roles in the Church, and the next  
 
century by the laws of Einsteinian physics, or salvation  
 
through Luther's understanding of justification, or new  
 
understanding that contextualizes St. Paul's comments in  
 
favor of women assuming leadership roles in the Church.  In  
 
fact, a short review of the history of the interpretation of  
 
the Bible reveals the Church changing its understanding of  
 
Jesus and important texts like the letters of St. Paul.   
 
Members of a given Christian community situated in a  
 
particular time and place have lived by the interpretations  
 
and understandings dominant for their particular time and  
 
place.2  The postmodern thesis that humans can assert only  
 interpretations, not absolute knowledge, strikes me as a  
 
very orthodox recognition of the finiteness of human  
 
understanding. 
 
     The second rather unfair criticism that Nisly alleges  
 
against postmodernists is their supposedly impossibly  
 
obscure terminology.  He approvingly quotes Victor  
 
Brombert's remarks from his 1989 MLA Presidential Address:   
 
there has been a "general tendency [for the literary critic]  
 
to seek refuge in a highly specialized terminology, to lock  
 
oneself up in hermetic discourse allowing for no  
 
intellectual commerce" (114).  And at first this seems true,  
 
but this generalization ignores the rather substantial  
 
intellectual commerce going on among postmodernists, a  
 
commerce that often crosses national, racial, gender, and  
 
communal boundaries other discourse communities fail to  
 
cross.  Two pages later Nisly quotes Brombert's caricature  
 
of postmodern critical discourse:  there is "considerable  
 
silliness in most sophisticated contemporary criticism:   
 
pretentious gibberish in the articles and books that flow  
 
from our presses, hermetic clowning at tiresome symposia"  
 (116).  I agree that many of the books and articles finding  
 
their way into print in the humanities are not worthy of the  
 
natural resources required to make them possible.  But I  
 
attribute this more to the pressure to publish than to  
 
postmodern epistemologies and metaphysics.  The truth is  
 
that we are often as communities confronted with new  
 
vocabularies or new ways of talking and negotiating meaning  
 
that require the work of understanding on our part if we  
 
wish to participate in the dialogues which these new  
 
discourses enable. 
 
     Allow me to illustrate what I mean with a rather  
 
non-academic example.  I remember attending a Larry Norman  
 
concert during the late 1970's , and he portrayed the  
 
problems of Christian fundamentalist "witnessing" language  
 
by imagining this scene:  the Christian witness approaches a  
 
man on the street and says, "Have you been born again,  
 
brother?" 
 
     The man pauses, puzzled, and replies, "I don't believe  
 
in reincarnation, and I can only remember having one  
 
mother." 
      Stymied, the Christian witness starts over.  "No, what  
 
I mean is, have you been saved?" 
 
     The witnessee ponders a moment and answers, "Well,  
 
several summers ago I was swimming in the lake at summer  
 
camp, and I started to drown, and the lifeguard rescued me,  
 
so I suppose you could say, 'yes, I have been saved.'" 
 
     Frustrated now, the Christian says with exasperation,  
 
"No, that's not it at all!  I want to know if you've been  
 
washed in the blood of the lamb!" 
 
     The equally frustrated witnessee replies, "Ugh, I hope  
 
not!" 
 
     Norman's simple scenario about the problems of special  
 
fundamentalist Christian jargon illustrates how every  
 
community develops language that shapes its understanding  
 
but does not often easily communicate without extensive  
 
explanation and translation into the language of another  
 
community.  (These same fundamentalist Christians who take  
 
my first-year courses at Messiah College get a great deal of  
 
sympathy from me-I was reared a fundamentalist-when they  
 
balk at terms like Nisly's "Creative Word."  These students  
 typically say something like, "Well, if he meant Jesus  
 
Christ, why didn't he just say Jesus Christ?"  A response  
 
such as "Well, that's not exactly what he wants to say"  
 
arouses their suspicion.) 
 
     In the literary community, this happens at a slightly  
 
more complex level.  I remember attending the 1987 Mideast  
 
Regional Conference on Christianity and Literature at  
 
Lynchburg College where Wheaton College Professor of English  
 
Leland Ryken delivered a banquet speech that parodied and  
 
indicted postmodernist discourse for what Brombert calls its  
 
"pretentious gibberish" and "hermetic clowning."  It was a  
 
good time, and since most of us were members of the  
 
evangelical and literary communities we understood each  
 
other and laughed.  But as I reflect on Ryken's performance  
 
and the audience's general resistance to postmodern  
 
discourse with its threat to their understanding of  
 
Christian faith (and life in general) and its demand for  
 
hard intellectual work for understanding, I am able to  
 
imagine similar moments in earlier history. 
 
     During the fifth century A.D., a group of local Roman  
 pagan scholars gather at the local academy for a banquet and  
 
address by one of their most admired members.  Comfortable  
 
in their centuries-old understanding of Stoic thinking,  
 
these pagans laugh as their speaker spoofs and parodies the  
 
new jargon emerging from the recent Church councils.  But  
 
instead of playing with terms like differance, implied  
 
reader, aporia, phallocentric, or Transcendental Signified,  
 
the speaker offers play on words like trinity, substance,  
 
hypostatic union, immaculate conception (from the same  
 
council who gave us hypostatic union!), and original sin.   
 
The speaker finishes with a parodic paraphrase of the  
 
obscure and impenetrable prose of Augustine amid belly  
 
laughter and flowing tears. 
 
     Or imagine a similar banquet occurring in late  
 
sixteenth-century Italy, where a group of Catholic scholars  
 
gather to poke fun at the new thinking and vocabulary of  
 
"Protestants."  Now the new, bizarre terms tossed around  
 
are terms like scripture interprets scripture (talk about  
 
speech-acts!), substitutionary atonement, priesthood of he  
 
believer, and presbyterian, and there is some laughter (and  
 concern, for they, like Ryken's audience are being  
 
threatened) at the New Historicist and deconstructionist  
 
readings of the Book of Revelation being performed by the  
 
strange Englishman John Bale and John Foxe, and perhaps they  
 
raise their eyebrows and ire at that expatriated French  
 
nihilist, John Calvin. 
 
     These imagined anecdotes reveal that new words and new  
 
ways of speaking and negotiating meaning make possible new  
 
understandings of God, humanity, and the universe.  And the  
 
history of religions and the history of the Christian  
 
religion in particular suggests that using language to  
 
create and shape communal and individual knowledge enables  
 
humans to define (set boundaries) and extend (push those  
 
boundaries out, even over) their knowledge and  
 
understanding.  Indeed, in its origin the Christian religion  
 
was an astonishing combination of an old vocabulary infused  
 
with radical new meanings and a bold new vocabulary that  
 
enabled human imaginations to stretch into new  
 
understandings of God and God's love:  the result was faith,  
 
meaning, and new life for both individuals and communities. 
      In this light, I find it ironic that Christian  
 
academics would censure postmodernists for new words and new  
 
structures of thought when in most situations they would, as  
 
a professors of the Humanities, both welcome and encourage  
 
the learning of new vocabulary and new structures of thought  
 
as a good thing that broadens and deepens thinking and  
 
enables understanding.  For example, I am sure most English  
 
professors would be pleased that I introduce freshmen to the  
 
new language of literary criticism in my course in English  
 
Literature to 1660.  I require them to learn such wonders as  
 
anagogical interpretation, pastoral elegy, oxymoron, terza  
 
rima, catharsis, romance epic (this one is not at all what  
 
they first imagine), and conceit (this too is not what they  
 
think).  And because as a college professor I am granted a  
 
bit of authority, and because students want to join the  
 
conversation that knowing these terms makes possible, they  
 
do the hard work of learning handbook definitions and  
 
applying them in the "required" contexts (they really read  
 
these definitions as absolutely authoritative until I reveal  
 
their conventional nature by adjusting some of them in the  
 context of the literature we read).  The only difference  
 
between the freshman experience of learning new literary  
 
terms and the experience of the literary critic who engages  
 
postmodernist discourse is that the terms and discourse  
 
learned by freshmen enjoy the broader authorization of the  
 
literary community-they enjoy a more privileged status than  
 
other similarly conventional terms and structures of new  
 
"radical" discourses. 
 
     I am doing the work of reading and understanding  
 
postmodern thinkers like Stanley Fish, David Bleich,  
 
Patricinio Schweickart, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and  
 
yes, even Jacques Derrida.  It is true that Fish, Bleich,  
 
and Schweickart are easier to read than Barthes, Kristeva,  
 
and Derrida.  They have the advantage of being native  
 
speakers of American English with the kind of helpful  
 
knowledge conventionally authorized by American communities.   
 
But they are postmodernists who speak clearly in  
 
vocabularies and structures even my students understand.  (I  
 
don't use postmodernist terminology in the classroom very  
 
often, and yet I consistently teach as a postmodern  
 Christian.)  In fact, learning the language of postmodernism  
 
has been very much like my experience in learning the  
 
languages and jargon of other disciplines such as  
 
psychology, theology, and philosophy.  And even the  
 
evangelical community is filled with the most casual use of  
 
the once new and obscure vocabularies of Marx, Freud, and  
 
Jung (not to mention the apostle Paul).  To finally exclude  
 
the wisdom of postmodern thinking from Christian discourse  
 
because the discourse is unfamiliar and perhaps difficult at  
 
moments is to refuse to do the kind of work that any convert  
 
to a Fundamentalist expression of evangelical Christianity  
 
performs in order to master the knowledge of her salvation,  
 
sanctification, and eschatological future in the space of  
 
years or even months.  After all, no one can deny that  
 
Christian communities foster as much esoteric jargon as most  
 
academic communities.  Stop and think about an individual  
 
from one Christian community who bothers to eavesdrop on an  
 
"in-house" theological conversation between members of  
 
another Christian community. 
 
     Finally, it is because I have both strengthened and  
 extended my understanding of and commitment to the Christian  
 
story by reading and thinking through the discourse of  
 
postmodernists like Stanley Fish and David Bleich that I  
 
find most evangelical Christian representations and  
 
assessments of postmodernism uninformed, oversimplified, and  
 
unconvincing.  And I don't find postmodernist epistemologies  
 
threatening to either my Christian understanding of God or  
 
my faith in God. 
 
     While I believe that my argument for learning new  
 
vocabularies might actually persuade those who take a stance  
 
similar to Nisley's, I suspect we will have more difficulty  
 
with a second difference.  Nisly asserts a foundational  
 
tenet in his essay which I cannot, with anything like  
 
conviction, espouse or commit myself to.  Nisly believes in  
 
the autonomous work:  "yet our goal is to hear what the work  
 
itself has to say" (116).  What is the "work itself" apart  
 
from the experience of a reader in community?  Nisly here  
 
echoes his earlier conventional bifurcation of "the primary  
 
text and the interpretive word" (114).  Such a dichotomy  
 
will not stand under scrutiny.  I see two problems here.   
 First, readers do not read texts and then interpret them.   
 
Encountering texts with a particular worldview (often  
 
well-developed even if the reader is not self-conscious of  
 
it) or set of basic and not-so-basic individual and communal  
 
assumptions, readers interpret in the very act of reading:   
 
readers are never not interpreting when they are reading.3   
 
They may not be developing an organized and detailed  
 
interpretation for public presentation, but they are always  
 
already interpreting and understanding during the act of  
 
reading.  Second, every "work" or "primary text" (they seem  
 
to be the same thing for Nisly) is an articulation of an  
 
interpretation of human experience as it is perceived by a  
 
human subject with a worldview disposition in the context of  
 
a particular community.  The reality of the layers of human  
 
interpretation involved in language and experience cannot be  
 
suppressed with assertions of the "work itself." 
 
     I believe Paul Nisly intuitively knows this, as he  
 
concedes crucial ground when he reiterates his theme: 
 
 
     I have argued that language is a special gift,  
     even a divine gift, and, further, I have contended  
     that within diversity we can work toward some  
     commonalities of meaning in the interpretation of  
     the text.  The text does have its own integrity,  
     whether it is the biblical text, or the text of a  
     novel or play or poem or short story.   
     Interpretation is, however, a very human and  
     fallible art. (116) 
"Exactly!" is the postmodernist reply.  Interpretation is a  
 
fallible art precisely because it is a human act; but as  
 
Stanley Fish notes, "Interpretation is the only game in  
 
town."  Nisly's own language has made a very significant  
 
shift here, as he is now talking about the text, not the  
 
"work itself."  But how does a text have  
 
integrity-especially if that text has been transmitted over  
 
centuries of human fallibility and was generated in the  
 
context of a fallible human culture?  A text that is not a  
 
translation and does not have a re-publication history might  
 
be credited with stability.  But once we begin the act of  
 
reading, we are never not interpreting the text, and the  
minute we begin to discuss or write about the "text" we have  
 
ventured into our understanding of the work as we have  
 
constructed or deconstructed it during the act of reading  
 
the text.  The text cannot be equated with the novel or play  
 
or poem or short story that we experience as readers.  This  
 
is why we have such wonderfully long and diverse histories  
 
of the interpretation of many biblical texts, of Milton's  
 
Eve, of Shakespeare's Hamlet, and Melville's white whale.   
 
This is why every performance of Macbeth is another Macbeth.   
 
The interpretation becomes/is the novel or play or poem or  
 
short story for the reader interpreting/reading. 
 
     Paul Nisly's problematic sense of the text as work  
 
informs one of his other very important assertions about  
 
words and meaning.  Nisly offers the following creed, safely  
 
assuming communal support:  "For we believe that both within  
 
and behind the text there is meaning."  But what is the  
 
meaning "behind" the text?  How does meaning get "behind"  
 
the text?  I turn the page and find more text (or the end  
 
and so my own reflection).4  But since we share community, I  
 
believe this remark is properly informed by-that is I  
 
understand it in-the context of Nisly's earlier remark that  
 
"the Creative Word, the Divine Word, who was from the  
 
beginning with God, is linked with our ability to use words,  
 
words which have meaningful content, words which we can  
 
mutually explore" (115, my emphasis).  This is for me the  
 
most important sentence in Nisly's essay, and as a  
 
postmodern Christian, I wholeheartedly affirm this. 
 
     But "meaningful content" arises in the context of human  
 
 
interpretative activity and nowhere else, and in the context  
 
of our "mutual exploration" of textual significance.  The  
 
"meaningful content" worked out and decided on, however, is  
 
authorized by the interpretative communities doing the work  
 
of "mutual exploration," not by the "work" (or text) itself.   
 
This is why both traditional Christians with absolutist  
 
epistemological and metaphysical claims and postmodern  
 
Christians with relativist epistemological and metaphysical  
 
claims (don't be fooled into thinking I am not claiming  
 
something quite understandable in this essay) keep talking,  
 
writing, and dialoguing both with those who do and with  
 
those who do not share their Christian faith. 
 
     But the recognition that dialogue and "mutual  
 
exploration" enable and provoke clarification and common  
 
understanding (as in everyday responses like "what did you  
 
mean by that?") also highlights that this is precisely what  
 
written texts cannot do, especially if the author of the  
 text is dead.  The problems with biblical texts are obvious.   
 
Paul begins 1 Corinthians 7 (a vexed text, a source of great  
 
physical and psychological pain in the history of the Church  
 
interpreting and submitting to interpretations of the text)  
 
by saying that he is answering certain questions posed by  
 
the Corinthians.  Nowhere are we told what these questions  
 
are.  We have no definitive context to assure our getting  
 
Paul's intentions "right."  And how do we read a term like  
 
"inspiration" in 2 Timothy 3:16?  The word is used only one  
 
time in the New Testament and applies there only to the  
 
Hebrew Scripture.  It has perhaps as many definitions as  
there are communities who care enough to try to give it  
 
definite meaning.  In fact, the human attempt to define the  
 
meaning of inspiration and its ramifications has been  
 
responsible for many of the dividing boundaries between  
 
particular Christian communities.  And why is Jesus  
 
represented in the Gospel as cursing the fig tree?  We have  
 
no Gospel writer come from the grave to solve this crux.  We  
 
are left with our interpretive attempts, and we cannot write  
 
or call the author even if the author could be of some help  
 
in establishing context and "intent." 
 
     I have turned to the example of Scripture because I  
 
believe that what really motivates evangelicals who  
 
sympathize with Nisly's excursions against postmodernism is  
 
a fear of the instability, chaos, and anarchy in the  
 
Christian community which they think will result from the  
 
apparent loss of a stable text or "common work"-a work/text  
 
that has often been accorded supernatural divine status.  I  
 
believe that such a fear, if it is indeed motivating the  
 
common evangelical exclusion of postmodern approaches from  
 
the Christian community, is ill-founded.  No work, not even  
 
the Bible, is finally or essentially stable:  this is a  
 
reality borne out in the history of biblical interpretation.   
 
This is a reality borne out in the fact that the divine text  
 
does not define "itself" in the same way for all those  
 
devout readers who sincerely commit themselves to  
 
understanding themselves and God in the context of its  
 
pages.  This does not mean that the Bible does not enjoy a  
 
great measure of stability in communities that share  
 
interpretative assumptions and strategies:  it does.  But  
 
Stanley Fish's observation about the text of Milton's Samson  
 
Agonistes also applies to the biblical texts:  they are  
 
"stable in more than one direction, as a succession of  
 
interpretive assumptions give [them] a succession of stable  
 
shapes" (274). 
 
     One solution for the lack of a "common work" is present  
 
in the example Nisly provides shortly after his confession  
 
of hope in the meaningful "content" of words.  He offers an  
 
anecdote about a preacher who presumed to offer the  
 
definitive interpretation of Jesus' parable about sewing the  
 
new cloth on the old garment.  Nisly remarks that the  
 
preacher's interpretation "did not seem persuasive to me"  
 
(115).  This is essentially a postmodern moment for Nisly.   
 
His use of the term "persuasive" reminds me of Stanley  
 
Fish's distinction between demonstration and persuasion and  
 
his argument that "all uses of language are interpretations  
 
of reality" (243), and that since interpretive communities  
 
authorize textual understanding, postmodern discourse will  
 
be necessarily characterized by dialogue and persuasion, not  
 
monologue and demonstration (demonstration is what  
 
traditional, positivist epistemologies attempt to do).  And  
 
so even in Christian communities, we attempt to persuade  
 
others to accept and believe our understanding of biblical  
 
texts and God's purposes; demonstration can occur only in  
 
the context of communally accepted and authorized boundaries  
 
which are, in the larger picture, undeniably conventional.5   
 
In other words, such "demonstration" is really persuasion in  
 
the guise of "evidence."  If you believe in the validity of  
 
certain kinds of evidence and methods of demonstrating what  
 
is "true," then such efforts can be used to persuade you. 
 
     Thus it is the interpretative community that provides  
 
stability and order, not the text or work.  To look for such  
 
stability and order from the text or work is to fool oneself  
 
willingly.  Often we do not realize this because many  
 
interpretations and understandings lead long lives and begin  
 
to appear as "self-evident" truths, and some interpretations  
 
experience glorious resurrections after an ignominious death  
 
at the hands of what has become for a new generation a  
 
"less-enlightened" older generation of readers and  
 
thinkers.  To say this is also to recognize that the  
 
interpretative community also provides the context for  
 
challenges to stability and order established by certain  
 
communal understandings of particular texts.  New readings  
 
and new uses of the "authoritative" text arise constantly.   
 
A good example of this is the early Christian community's  
 
new understanding and use of the Jewish Scriptures in  
 
first-century Palestine. 
 
     In conclusion, while I affirm language as God's gift to  
 
humanity, I do not believe language or "reality" has a  
 
meaning which we discover or find, that is meaning that is  
 
absolute, universal, objective, or inherent in the universe  
 
we "find" ourselves in.  The meanings that we do "discover,"  
 
or feel that we "discover," are meanings created, shaped,  
 
and decided by the numerous human communities that have  
 
preceded our own.  Human beings in community create, shape,  
 
and decide the meaning of human experience and how that is  
 
to be understood in the context of a communally authorized  
 
understanding of God.  I agree with Robert M. Grant's  
 
contextualization of the New Testament texts: 
 
 
     [F]or it was the church in which and for which the  
     texts were written, by members of the church; it  
     was the church which preserved, selected, and  
     transmitted the texts.  The central meaning or  
     cluster of meanings is therefore to be found  
     within the church's life and understandings,  
     broadly considered. (143) 
     When we always approach the Christian canon with rigid  
 
assumptions about its unity, coherence, or "flatness" (that  
 
is as a static work), we hazard missing the way in which the  
 
texts in the biblical canon dialogue with one another,  
 
providing a paradigm for the kind of sacred dialogue we  
 
should be involved in and carrying on as Christians.  The  
 
differences in detail and purpose among the four Gospels  
 
suggest the need for continuing dialogue about the meaning  
 
of Jesus. 
 
     At this point I would like to describe the big picture  
 
of my understanding of human experience, the world, and God.   
 
Unlike Calvin, I see the universe as an open universe.  God  
 
has not inscribed detailed meanings into material phenomena  
 
or the experience of the "spiritual."  God has not  
 
determined the details of individual, national, or racial  
 
histories.  God has not encoded into the universe and human  
 
experience a meaning which can only be discovered or found.   
 
Instead, God has created an open universe where beings made  
 
in God's image have the freedom to shape and reshape their  
 
understanding of human experience.  God has created an open  
 
universe where all human decisions and uses of language have  
 
meaning.  God has infused God's infinite divinity into a  
 
universe where God delights in the interpretative and  
 
community-building activities of humans who have the genuine  
 
capacity to surprise and delight God.  This is not the  
 
nihilism of Calvinism-sovereignty does not demand absolute  
 
divine control and manipulation of the details of human  
 
history and life.  Sovereignty means God will use divine  
 
power to finally redeem everything human.6 
 
     When I look at Donald Hettinga's struggle to continue  
 
asserting an absolute reality even as his discussion of the  
 
New Rhetoricians pulls him in the other direction, so that  
 
he just as often speaks insights possible only in a  
 
postmodern paradigm, I wonder why he wants to cling to an  
 
absolutist epistemology and metaphysic that prefers evidence  
 
to faith (75, 82).7  We are not called to prove or  
 
demonstrate our Christian faith claims:  yet  
 
proof-demonstration-is the definitive function of an  
 
absolutist epistemology.  We are called to confess our  
 
Christian faith and live and speak in a way that persuades  
 
others to embrace the Christian story and live in the  
 
context of the communally established authority we have  
 
forged for that story.  This can be done in the framework of  
 
a relativist epistemology; in fact, I am doing just that. 
 
     Indeed, to echo Luther, I can do no other.  Here I  
 
stand, so help me God.  The truth of the postmodern  
 
epistemological and metaphysical paradigm I have used to  
 
critique the too common evangelical view of language and  
 
texts as represented by Paul Nisly's essay convicts me with  
 
all the force of any Holy spirit that convinced Luther of  
 
the truths of the nominalist philosophy that eventually  
 
shaped his understanding of St. Paul.  I am committed to  
 
understanding God and human experience in the paradigm of  
 
the Christian story because the possibilities for  
 
responsible and ethical living in Christian community seem  
 
to me to be greatest.  And it is the Christian community  
 
which authorizes the sacred texts-not the other way around. 
 
     And, finally, I have faith in God, a faith, as Sam Keen  
 
would put it, that has "survived the death of many  
 
beliefs."8  Echoing St. Paul, I say that my knowledge of  
 
truth is partial; and I find myself trusting God's knowledge  
 
of me, not my knowledge of God.  And as a postmodern  
 
Christian I affirm with St. Paul that "[m]eanwhile these  
 
three remain:  faith, hope, and love; and the greatest of  
 
these is love (1 Corinthians 13:13). 
 
 
Notes 
 
     1After discussing Paul Nisly's essay with him, I believe  
it would be more accurate to say that I am offering a  
critical response to the ways in which I suspect and  
anticipate many of my conservative evangelical colleagues in  
the Christian College Coalition will read (interpret)  
Nisly's essay (in fact, the way I myself would have read  
the essay five or six years ago).  In my discussion with  
Paul respecting this, I believe he realizes that his essay  
will be read by many in the way I anticipate; even as author  
he cannot control readers' interpretations of his writing.   
(Although, unlike dead authors, he may respond, as I have  
welcomed him to do to this critique.) 
     2For more on this I recommend Jaroslav Pelikan's Jesus  
Through the Centuries:  His Place in the History of Culture  
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985) and Robert M.  
Grant and David Tracy's A Short History of the  
 
Interpretation of the Bible, 2nd ed., revised and enlarged  
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984). 
     3Readers interested in hermeneutics will recognize by my  
language that I owe a large debt to Stanley Fish's Is There  
a Text in This Class?:  The Authority of Interpretive  
Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980)  
both for the kind of language and the kind of theoretical  
structure that enables me to articulate both my criticism of  
one understanding of language and my own paradigm for  
Christian faith. 
     4I am deliberately playful here, for I suppose that Paul  
Nisley's meaning in a term like "behind" the text (and since  
we share a number of communities I am confident in going  
"behind" Nisly's text for understanding) is roughly similar  
to David Tracy's:  "in the mind of the author, in the  
original social setting, in the original audience."  Of  
course, Tracy's recognition of author, setting, and audience  
suggests that meaning "behind" a text is also negotiated.   
But I also agree with Tracy that "the primary meaning of the  
text does not lie 'behind' it nor even 'in' the text  
itself"; instead, "the meaning of the text lies in front  
of the text-in the now common question, the now common  
subject matter of both text and interpreter" (159).  The  
relation between the words "common" and "community" make  
this realization particularly relevant to my emphasis on the  
community as the negotiator and authorizer of meaning. 
     5The idea of convention is very helpful for an  
understanding of my argument.  Again, the context for my  
thinking can be found in Fish:   
     I am not claiming that there are no facts; I am  
     merely raising a question as to their status:  do  
     they exist outside conventions of discourse (which  
     are then more or less faithful to them) or do they  
     follow from the assumptions embodied in those same  
     conventions? . . . What I have been suggesting is  
     that identification (or specification of facts) is  
     always within a story.  Some stories, however, are  
     more prestigious than others; and one story is  
     always the standard one, the one that presents  
     itself as uniquely true and is, in general, so  
     accepted.  Other, nonstandard, stories will of  
     course continue to be told, but they will be  
     regarded as nonfactual, when, in fact, they will  
     only be nonauthorized. (237, 239) 
     6Some readers might recognize here my affinity with Mark  
S. McCleod's "multi-realist" epistemology as expressed in  
"Making God Dance:  Postmodern Theorizing and the Christian  
College," Christian Scholar's Review 21.3 (March 1992):   
275-92. 
     7"In the world we come to know there is the reality, the  
evidence of an all-powerful, all-loving God, a reality that  
is discernible through personal experience, but a reality  
that is not merely personal because it is accessible to all,  
or at least for all for whom the veil is removed" (Donald  
Hettinga, "Christians in the Worlds of Discourse," Faculty  
Dialogue 17 (Spring 1992): 75, my emphases).  Hettinga's  
last clause, "for all for whom the veil is removed,"  
deconstructs the preceding assertions, since such  
"knowledge" and discernment come only to those for whom the  
veil is removed, guaranteeing its "personal" nature and  
suggesting its capricious ways.  There is also the  
difficulty in realizing that "evidence" is evidence only  
when it is interpreted or construed as such, and those of us  
who have lived through personal experiences that more  
clearly suggest the absence or powerlessness or carelessness  
of God will have some difficulty joining Hettinga in  
construing our experience to reflect the reality he is  
arguing for; for us there can only be faith and hope,  
without knowledge and evidence.  In some cases, our faith  
and hope strains against the weight of countering knowledge  
and evidence:  it is love alone (God is love) that  
sustains. 
     8Sam Keen, To a Dancing God (New York, NY: Harper & Row,  
1970), dedication page. 
 
 
 
 
